

2. DELINEATION OF THE TOPIC AND METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Language scholars have identified functions of language where communication of ideas is a marginal consideration. Language can be used as a means of getting rid of our nervous energy when we are under stress. In fact, this is one of the commonest uses of language, and it is the clearest case of what is often called an ‘emotive’ or ‘expressive’ function of language. “Swear words and obscenities are probably the commonest signals to be used in this way, especially when we are in an angry or frustrated state. But, there are also emotive utterances of a positive kind, such as our involuntary verbal reactions to beautiful art or scenery, our expressions of fear and affection and the emotional outpourings of certain kinds of poetry.”¹

Whereas the release of nervous energy can occur whether or not we are alone, during social interaction, language is often used to maintain a comfortable relationship between people. The exchange of pleasantries such as ‘Good morning’, ‘Pleased to meet you’ or saying ‘Bless you’ to someone who has sneezed and responding to this with a ‘Thank you’ do not communicate factual content, neither do the ritual exchanges about health or the weather communicate what is usually understood as ‘ideas’. “Sentences of this kind are usually **automatically produced and stereotyped in structure**.² They often state the obvious (e.g. *Lovely day*) or have no content at all (e.g. *Hello*).³ They certainly require a special kind of explanation, and this is found in the idea that language is here being used for the purpose of maintaining rapport between people. The anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski (1884-1942) coined the phrase ‘phatic communion’ to refer to this social function of language, which arises out of the basic human need to signal friendship – or, at least, lack of enmity. For someone to withhold these sentences when they are expected, by staying silent, is a sure sign of distance, alienation, even danger.”⁴ Needless to say, cultures vary greatly in the topics which they permit as phatic communion and in how much or how little of it is expected.

Hayakawa⁵ defines phatic communion (in the chapter he has entitled *The Language of Social Cohesion*) as “a type of speech in which ties of union are created by a mere exchange of words”. He quotes Bronislaw Malinowski as follows: “Are words in Phatic Communion used primarily to convey meaning, the meaning which is symbolically theirs? Certainly not! They fulfil a social function and that is their principal aim, but they are neither the result of intellectual reflection, nor do they necessarily arouse reflection in the listener.”⁶

¹ *The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Language*, David Crystal, Cambridge University Press, 1987 (Reprint, 1989), p. 10.

² Boldface added.

³ This study aims at unraveling what may be considered the “automatic” and “stereotyped” phrases used by the author in this particular text. In other words, what seems to be the “obvious” thing to say, in the material under study.

⁴ *The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Language*, 1989, p. 10.

⁵ Hayakawa, 1978, p. 77.

⁶ The issue of how ‘intellectual content’ can be distinguished from ‘emotive content’ and whether such a separation is wise, or even possible, has had many thinkers running up and down the alleys of thought. Some remarks on this subject follow at the end of the next paragraph. Pertinent contributions to the discussions revolving around this subject have been made by the following authors: Meidner, *The Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics* 1994 states the following: There are brief utterances which have purely emotive meaning (e.g. exclamations of surprise, anger or pleasure). “Far more commonly, words combine emotive meaning with cognitive or ‘referential’ meaning. Essentially the feeling expressed in a particular word is simple, being either a positive or a negative attitude towards his subject matter or his addressee.” Needless to say, the terms ‘positive’ and ‘negative’, or more simplistically, ‘good’ and ‘bad’ have given literary critics a headache for a long time, and they have turned both to psychologists and to anthropologists for ideas on how to define these concepts. I.A. Richards, *Principles of Literary Criticism*, 1925, p. 44 says the following: There is no

Another related function of language is to provide an outlet for our reactions and attitudes.⁷ At the most basic level such expressions of emotion consist of conventional semi-linguistic noises often called interjections (e.g. *Wow, Ouch*) or phrases (e.g. *My goodness, What a sight*). There are many literary devices of vocabulary and grammar which can be picked out to study how a writer conveys feelings. However, the more sophisticated they are, the more difficult and complex it becomes to distinguish the emotional function of language from its function as the conveyor of ideas.⁸

sound reason why a purely psychological account of the differences between good, bad, and indifferent experiences should not be given. The data for such an inquiry are in part supplied by anthropology. "It has become clear that the disparity among the states of mind recognised as good by persons of different races, habits and civilisations is overwhelming." People disagree widely even in their home circles. A vast accumulation of anthropological evidence now available establishes the fact that 'as the organisation of life and affairs alters very different experiences are perceived to be good or bad, favoured or condemned.' And on p. 45: "We must allow, it is true, for widespread confusion between intrinsic and instrumental values, and for the difficulty of identifying experiences. Many states of mind in other people which we judge to be bad or indifferent are no doubt unlike what we imagine them to be, or contain elements which we overlook, so that with fuller knowledge we might discover them to be to be good. In this manner it may be possible to reduce the reported disparity of value institutions, but few people acquainted with varying moral judgments of mankind will doubt that circumstances and necessities, present and past, explain our approval and disapproval. We start, then, with a hearty scepticism of all immediate intuitions, and inquire how it is that individuals in different conditions, and at different stages of their development, esteem things so differently."

⁷ *The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Language*, 1989, p. 171: In the spoken language, intonation is used "to express a wide range of attitudinal meanings – excitement, boredom, surprise, friendliness, reserve, and many hundreds more. Here, intonation works along with other prosodic and paralinguistic features to provide the basis of all kinds of vocal emotional expression." The function of language as a vehicle for expressing attitudes finds its way into the written language as well, although such a statement is even harder to demonstrate than visible signs of 'an attitude'. A.I. Richards, 1925, p. 110-113 explains 'attitude' as follows: "The result of the co-ordination of a great number of impulses of different kinds is very often that no overt action takes place ... the analogy with the case of the mathematician is not misleading. The fact that he will not make half so many marks on paper as a schoolboy does not show that he is any less active. His activity takes place at an earlier stage in which his responses are merely incipient or imaginal. In a similar manner the absence of any overt movements or external signs of emotion in an experienced reader of poetry, or concert-goer, compared to the evident disturbances which are sometimes to be seen in the novice, is no indication of any lack of internal activity .. A thousand tendencies to actions, which do not overtly take place, may well occur in complicated adjustments. For these what evidence there is must be indirect. In fact, the only attitudes which are capable of clear and explicit analysis are those in which some simple mode of observable behaviour gives the clue to what has been taking place, and even here only a part of the reaction is open to this kind of examination. *Among the experiences which are by the nature of the case hidden from observation are found almost all those with which criticism is concerned.* [italics added] The outward aspect and behaviour of a man reading *The Prioresses' Tale* and *The Miller's Tale* may well be indistinguishable. But this should not lead us to overlook how great a part in the whole experience is taken by attitudes... This aspect of experiences ... faint preliminary preparations for doing this or that, has been constantly overlooked in criticism. Yet it is in terms of attitudes, the resolution, inter-animation, and balancing of impulses – Aristotle's definition of Tragedy is an instance – that all the most valuable effects of poetry must be described." On p. 112 Richards states that since that which is called 'attitudes' is the imaginal and incipient activities or tendencies to action, it is should not come as a surprise that the classification and analysis of attitudes is not yet far advanced. But on the matter of the communication of attitudes he states on p. 179: "Communications involving attitudes are deeper than those in which references alone are concerned. Abstract analysis and prose, in fact, depends for its success upon the shallowness of its draught. It must avoid any stirring of the emotions lest its required distinctions become obscured." From all of the above, we can surmise that: attitudes exist, they are hard to detect, until they are communicated, which does not mean that making inferences about how or when they have been communicated is any easier than detecting their presence in the first place.

⁸ *The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Language*, 1989, p. 10. See also Hayakawa 1978, p. 68-71, who discusses this problem under the title *Words with Built-in Judgements* as follows: Words that arouse both informative and affective connotations simultaneously, that is they communicate a fact and a judgement on the fact in the same word, confer a special complexity on discussions, wherever they occur. Examples of such words are: atheist, prostitute, radical, liberal, Arab, Jew, Mexican, etc. In fact, any word, may carry an in-built judgement, depending on the context it is used in. In dealing with subjects which arouse heated feelings, we are often compelled to talk in roundabout terms in order to avoid traditional prejudices, which hinder clear thinking. p. 68: "Such verbal stratagems are necessitated by the strong affective connotations as well as by the often misleading implications of their blunter alternatives; they are not merely a matter of giving things fancy names in order to fool people, as the simple-minded often believe." Charged terminology

Stylistic studies provide one way of analyzing a text and determining its content. “Style is seen as the (conscious or unconscious) selection of a set of linguistic features from all the possibilities in a language. The effects these features convey can be understood only by intuitively sensing the choices that have been made (as when we react to the linguistic impact of a religious archaism, a poetic rhyme scheme, or a joke), and it is usually enough simply to respond to the effect in this way. But there are often occasions when we have to develop a more analytical approach, ... Here, when we need to explain our response to others, ... our intuition needs to be supplemented by a more objective account of style. It is this approach which is known as *stylistics*.”⁹

In order to give a more or less objective account of our views, at some point, it becomes necessary to count the frequency of the features we are interested in, plot their distribution in a sample and compare their occurrence with available statistical data for the whole language. In cases where, for example, large-scale counts of word frequency have been made, the language acts as a ‘norm’ against which idiosyncratic features are made to stand out. Such studies are called *stylostatistics*, or *stylometrics*, and comprise the major part of the field of *statistical linguistics*. “Nobody can count everything; and even if modern computers printed out comprehensive accounts of the linguistic structure of texts, there would not be enough time available to analyse them. On the other hand, the larger the sample of data analysed, the more confident our conclusions will be. Stylostatistical studies thus tend to use a small number of carefully chosen textual features and to search for these in as large a body of text as is practicable.”¹⁰ Quantitative studies, which use such variables as parts of speech; the length of words, sentences or lines (characteristics that do not relate directly to the meaning of a text); or the size and diversity of an author’s vocabulary (characteristics that relate directly to meaning); or alternatively, which conduct a detailed study of conjunctions, single words, or which pay attention to words that occur only once in a text, in the works of an individual author, or in the language as a whole (called *hapax legomena*), date to the 19th century, after which a great deal of effort has been devoted to devising measures that are statistically satisfactory as well as stylistically interesting.¹¹

The field of semantics aids in the study of meanings in language.¹² “The term did not come to be widely used until the 20th century, but the subject it represents is very old, reaching back to the writings of Plato and Aristotle, and attracting the special interest of philosophers, logicians, and (these days) linguists.”¹³ After much debate over how to define ‘meaning’, as a concept, it has been

such as ‘Hoodlums should be sent to prison’ can be modified to ‘Maladjusted youngsters are in need of rehabilitation’. There is a marked difference in attitude between these sentences, and a reduced level of built-in judgement in the second one. Reducing built-in judgement may involve the use of euphemisms in order to avoid hurting feelings unnecessarily and in order to pave the way for constructive interaction or developments. p. 71: “Every reader is acquainted with certain people who, according to their own flattering descriptions of themselves, “believe in being frank” and like to “tell it like [sic] it is.” By “telling it like it is,” they usually mean calling anything or anyone by the term which has the strongest and most disagreeable affective connotations. Why people should pin medals on themselves for “candor” for performing this nasty feat has often puzzled me. Sometimes it is necessary to violate verbal taboos as an aid to clearer thinking, but more often “calling a spade a spade” is to provide our minds with a greased runway down which we may slide back into old *and discredited* patterns of evaluation and behavior.” In this study, I will make a point of discussing the lexemes which I consider to have built-in judgements which reveal an attitude towards the fact that is provided. (The other questions connected with how to identify ‘emotive content’ are discussed in the section *Defining Emotive Content*.)

⁹ *The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Language*, 1989, p. 66.

¹⁰ *The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Language*, 1989, p. 67.

¹¹ *The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Language*, 1989, p. 67.

¹² The workbook *Semantics – a coursebook* by James R. Hurford & Brendan Heasley, 1994, adequately covers the main concepts of semantics.

¹³ *The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Language*, 1989, p. 100.

generally accepted that the finding of an acceptable ‘meaning’ for it, is as far away today as it was in Plato’s time, for the simple reason that, ‘meaning’ cannot have a separate entity, apart from what is ‘meant’ by the use of a word in a particular context, just as measures such as ‘height’, ‘weight’ or ‘length’ have no abstract existence independently of the objects they measure. To say that something has ‘height’ or ‘weight’ is to say that it is so many units of a measurement.¹⁴ Leonard Bloomfield (1887-1949) has expounded a behaviourist view of meaning in his book *Language* (1933), where he states that meaning is something that can be deduced solely from a study of the situation in which speech is used. His theory, that a stimulus produces a request, and when the speech is understood, it produces a response, is not, however, unproblematic. In many situations, it is difficult to demonstrate what the relevant features of the stimulus / response are, as when events are not clearly visible in physical terms. (The example Bloomfield gives, is that Jill is hungry, sees an apple, asks Jack to get it for her, the linguistic stimulus he gets leads him to give her the apple. His action, in turn, makes what she said to him understandable to us.) This schema is hard to apply to the expression of feelings and is even more difficult to rely upon in cases where people do not act in predicted or expected ways.¹⁵ Yet, this method has come to be relied upon by modern linguists, who study meaning by making detailed analyses of the way words and sentences are used in specific contexts. “It is an approach shared by several philosophers and psychologists. Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951), in particular, stressed its importance in his dictum: ‘the meaning of a word is its use in the language’.”¹⁶

Psychologists have contributed their input to semantics by sharing the concern of establishing the semantic properties of individual words. They have proposed several approaches for plotting differences and quantifying the effects a word has on the hearer. “A pioneering work in this field was C. E. Osgood, G. Suci, & P. Tannenbaum, *The Measurement of Meaning* (1957), which was a study of ‘affective’ meaning – the emotional reactions attached to a test that they called a ‘semantical differential’ – the name reflecting the view that it was possible to analyse meaning into a range of different dimensions.”¹⁷ Concretely speaking, subjects were asked to rate words on a scale of seven degrees, ranging from good to bad, weak to strong, rough to smooth, active to passive, fresh to stale, and so on. This provided the researcher with a graph which could be used to interpret how a person or group of people felt about a word. The semantic differential procedure does not provide information about the basic meaning of a word but only about emotions the word generates. Other illustrative and diagrammatic techniques have been developed to display other types of information about language. These analyses are very simple, and cannot cover all aspects of language, but “the general approach is illuminating, with considerable research potential.”¹⁸

In order to aid detailed linguistic research, terms which correspond better to the features being studied than words used in everyday speech have had to be devised. In the study of grammar and morphology, the smallest meaningful component of a word is called a *morpheme* (the word un-happi-ness, for instance, can be reduced to its three morphemes).¹⁹ In phonology, when it was noticed that the same letter of the alphabet (be it a consonant or a vowel, but especially so, in the case of vowels) has a different pronunciation – a different sound – depending on the word it is used in, the word *phoneme* was taken into use. Over 40 important phonemes – different sounds – have been identified and these are transcribed within slant lines using the normal set of phonetic symbols,

¹⁴ *The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Language*, 1989, p. 102.

¹⁵ *The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Language*, 1989, p. 101.

¹⁶ *The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Language*, 1989, p. 102.

¹⁷ *The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Language*, 1989, p. 103.

¹⁸ *The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Language*, 1989, p. 103.

¹⁹ *The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Language*, 1989, p. 90.

in studies concerned with phonological phenomena as exhibited by the user of a language.²⁰ Similarly, in the field of semantics, the word ‘word’ has been substituted by the term *lexeme* or *lexical item*. From a semantic point of view, the words *walk*, *walks*, *walking* and *walked* are variants of the same word. For the purposes of semantic analysis, these four different words do not express more than one basic unit – the lexeme, or lexical item here, is the depiction of the act of walking. Idioms are also units of meaning; so, for example *to kick the bucket* (= to die), is a lexeme.²¹ In this study, I use the term lexeme or lexical item to denote ‘affective units’, be these words, phrases, or sentences.

Many philosophical and linguistic attempts have been made to classify the words or concepts in a language. In relatively recent times, a popular and very influential work was compiled by Peter Mark Roget (1779-1869), who published the *Thesaurus* known by his name in 1852. In it, he divided vocabulary into six main areas: *abstract relations*, *space*, *matter*, *intellect*, *volition* and *affections*. Each area was given a detailed and exhaustive sub-classification, producing 1,000 semantic categories in all. For example, the category *affections* was divided into: *general terms*, *personal*, *sympathetic*, *moral* and *religious*. Each subdivision was further subdivided. The subdivision *moral*, for example, was subdivided into: *obligation*, *sentiments*, *conditions*, *practice*, and *institutions*. *Practice*, to take one example of the previous subdivision, was subdivided into: *temperance*, *intemperance*, *sensualism*, *asceticism*, etc.²² It is noteworthy, that Norman Lewis in the updated revised edition of *Roget’s Thesaurus – Dictionary Form* (1978 Edition), considers it an innovation to list the entries of the *Thesaurus* in alphabetical order, and defends doing away with the original format as “cutting loose from tradition”.²³ He explains that: “Separation [of words/concepts] into watertight compartments makes neither for speed nor convenience”.²⁴ The *Thesaurus* is clearly (in its present form) meant as a tool for writers rather than researchers, but one cannot help but wonder, whether such an ‘improvement’ does not somehow declare the failure of the attempt to force words, concepts and ideas into rigid compartments. It seems that all that a prospective surveyor of the affective substance in a language or text is left with, is the alternative of identifying lexemes, scanning their use in their contexts, while relying on intuition (for the lack of an accurate scientific criterion for determining connotations²⁵), backed up and checked by

²⁰ *The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Language*, 1989, p. 160

²¹ *The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Language*, 1989, p. 104

²² *The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Language*, 1989, p. 104 (The above explanation is based on the diagramme to be found on this page.)

²³ *The New Roget’s Thesaurus in Dictionary Form*, 1978 Edition, Preface, p. 6.

²⁴ *The New Roget’s Thesaurus in Dictionary Form*, 1978 Edition, Preface, p. 5.

²⁵ Hayakawa, 1978, p. 52-53: Extensional meanings (denotations) are the objects a word refers to in the physical world. Intensional meanings (connotations) are the notions which are suggested inside one’s head (when they are many, they might start ‘spinning in one’s head’ – a phrase Hayakawa uses). An extensional meaning can be pointed to, whereas an intensional meaning is not operational, in that we cannot see, touch, photograph, or in any scientific manner detect its presence – nevertheless, it exists. Hayakawa states that arguments over intensional meanings have no way of ending to the satisfaction of all disputants. They can be endless and are futile, which is a reason to avoid getting into them. O. M. Meidner, *The Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics*, p. 1111, states that: “Native speakers’ intuitive expertise in ‘expressing themselves’ in dual-function words, and in responding to others’ expressions, can readily be applied to making a conscious distinction between the emotive and the cognitive components of meaning in a given utterance.” This last quote, warrants three comments: 1. Meidner gives the ‘native speaker’ leave to draw conclusions (about intensional meanings) based on intuition and experience. 2. Meidner provides Hayakawa’s book *Language in Thought and Action* (the 2nd edition, 1964, of which I have consulted the 4th edition, 1978) as a reference in his Bibliography and uses some examples from Hayakawa in his article, but has not heeded Hayakawa’s warnings against a) the use of the term ‘emotive’, which he prefers to substitute with ‘affective’; b) considering ‘emotive’ and ‘cognitive’ components of meaning as opposite poles in language (both these points, a) & b) are discussed at length in the beginning of the next section). 3. In spite of the fact that no fixed or ‘scientific’ means for determining extensional meanings exist, which becomes a legitimate exercise in ‘semantic analysis’ (as I mention elsewhere in this paper and as Meidner gives ‘native speakers’ leave to do), it must be born in mind, that a good chunk of the vocabulary of a language used in medieval

stylostatistics. At least, that is what my own probing into how else to choose a fitting method for conducting this study has led me to deduce, as I have tried (maybe too painstakingly) to outline above. But without effective definitions of what constitutes affective content, only more or less chaotic observations can be made about the subject. Quite surprisingly, I found what I consider to be a blunt but useful tool to dig into my study with, in the reference material dealing with the age-old discipline of rhetoric.

Traditionally, the field of *rhetoric* – the study of persuasive speech or writing (especially as practiced in oratory) – has contained hundreds of ‘rhetorical figures’, which have been introduced by classical rhetoricians, classifying the way words could be arranged in order to achieve special stylistic effects. “Many were restricted to the patterns found in Latin or Greek, but some achieved a broader currency, especially after the Renaissance, in studies of poetry.”²⁶ The study of *rhetoric*’s has long ago been overridden by *stylistic analysis*, which, although it does not emphasize mastering long lists of labels, has retained an inventory of classifications, which are referred to nowadays as ‘figures of speech’.²⁷ It may be added, that controversies over the relationship of form to content / meaning date to the earliest times. Nowadays, such distinctions have blurred in favour of a more integrative view of the interdependence of form and meaning. The juxtaposition: form contra meaning is quite meaningless in view of the focus of this study, which in essence, aims to find the link which I suspect exists between emotive content and phatic communion – something I hope to succeed in demonstrating in the following pages.

The first step in achieving this was to investigate the tool I had found to set out about this task. In works dealing with ‘rhetorical devices’, the classical terms and their definitions have been retained, as mentioned above. Coming upon a rather extensive list of terms and their definitions, entitled “emotional appeals”²⁸ suggested to me that this list can be employed in screening the emotive content of my corpus. The act of picking out these ‘appeals’ and grouping them under the appropriate categories was ‘an exercise in semantics’,²⁹ in that each lexeme had to be understood within the context it occurred in.³⁰ After the process of screening, it was possible to obtain

times had markedly different denotations – let alone connotations – from what is understood by the words in the present day. This gap can be partly bridged by familiarity with focal research results dealing with this subject, but not fully. If ‘entering the mind’ of another person, however close, is next to impossible to do, then picturing what went on in people’s minds hundreds of years ago, can lead to making wild guesses at best. It goes without saying, that the exercise of picking out connotations is always a subjective practice, at best. However, as mentioned before, literary criticism always involves a degree of ‘feeling one’s way about’.

²⁶ *The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Language*, 1989, p. 70.

²⁷ *The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Language*, 1989, p. 70. Note that a list of 17 emotional appeals is provided under the statement: “The complex universe of traditional rhetoric is clearly illustrated from this small selection of classical terms which described the types of emotional appeals.” It is precisely such an expanded list which I use to group emotional appeals for the purpose of gaining some statistical insight into their occurrence in my corpus, in this study.

²⁸ Lanham, *A Handlist of Rhetorical Terms*, 1991, p. 186-188.

²⁹ O.M.Meidner, Emotive Meaning, *The Encyclopedia of Languages and Linguistics*, 1994, Vol. III, p. 1111 makes the following distinction between ‘semantic analysis’ and ‘semantics’: Techniques of ‘close reading’ were developed based on the theories that held that some areas of language (such as poetry) justifiably use emotive language, whereas others (such as literary criticism) do not. “Students of the humanities were taught to scan each word or phrase in a given text (literary or not) to account fully for its contribution, including emotive meaning, to its present context by reference both to elements surrounding it in the given text and also to connotations acquired from past applications. Such ‘semantic’ analysis is different from ‘semantics’ as a division of linguistics, which marshals the meaning components of given words apart from any actual text or utterance. Semantic analysis may produce results akin to deconstruction, though resting on a different view of language and literature. Close reading is indispensable to both, and also to the assessment of emotive meaning.”

³⁰ Hayakawa, 1987, p. 54: One of the premises upon which modern linguistic thought is based is that *no word ever has exactly the same meaning twice*. (Footnote: “In the same vein, the Greek philosopher Heraclitus asserted that one cannot step into the same river twice.”) p. 55: Recognizing the existence of ‘intensional meanings’ personalizes interpretation, adding an understanding of the dimension created by the fact that different images arise in the minds of different people

statistics, which provide an objective basis for the attempt to quantify the frequency of the occurrence of emotional appeals, in general, and particular ones, in particular. Analyzing the significance of statistical findings is naturally the next step one aims to take. Yet, whether or not one can meaningfully interpret such findings, obtaining such statistics, in my opinion, is an imperative first step which needs to be taken, and which could be considered an achievement in its own right, irrespective of how it is analyzed. Especially, since numbers and figures have a quality of absoluteness which views and interpretations, by their very definition, can never have. (Granted, of course, that everything is relative and that different processes as well as mechanical errors can produce greatly varying counts and figures of the same features, in a study such as this one.) Having said that I consider providing the statistics that indicate how frequently emotional appeals are employed in my corpus, and how frequently each type of emotional appeal occurs, a goal in itself, I do have a premise as to how these findings can be analyzed, although I believe that the material I have collected and compiled can be used in many different ways.

The aim of this paper, therefore, is twofold: 1. Providing stylostatistical data. 2. Discussing how this data can be interpreted, by formulating and trying to support a relevant hypothesis. The hypothesis I myself use in this thesis is the following:

Emotive content can be understood as a reflection of the nature and force of phatic communion³¹ in the situations and circles it is produced in or described as being produced by.

In a sense, this can be said to be a retrospective sociolinguistic / psycholinguistic literary study. During the course of my discussion, I will do my best to introduce, define and adequately cover the debates raised by relevant concepts, terms and research, to arrive at my conclusions. My final aim is to point out that when the link between emotive content and phatic communion expressed in a literary text, such as the one under study, is made, more can be said about the ‘culture’, ‘mentality’, ‘value system’, ‘outlook’, ‘attitude’ and ‘the individual’s vs. collective’s psychological dispositions’ in a ‘society’ – all of which are highly elusive terms in that they continuously defy definition.

when the same word is mentioned to them. What a person visualizes when he or she hears simple words such as ‘kettle’ or ‘typewriter’ depends on the particular ‘kettles’ or ‘typewriters’ which they have personally had dealings with. To elaborate, one might take this argument one step further and state that visualization also depends on whether the hearer’s contact with these articles has been actual or is based on second-hand exposure. (See also *The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Language*, p. 102, where the distinction between ‘sense’ and ‘reference’ is said to be a critical one in the field of semantics, which is concerned with the ‘sense’ that a word or group of words can make to the speakers/users of a language, quite independently of the ‘references’ these words might have to in the physical world.) p. 56: “... the ignoring of contexts in any act of interpretation is at best a stupid practice. At its worst, it can be a vicious practice.” So, one might sum up, that although ‘fixing’ meanings definitively and unequivocally is impossible because of the multitude of psychological, cultural and other factors which come into play during communication, context remains quite a reliable indicator of what is meant or intended. As is stated on p. 100 of *The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Language*: If everyone were to use words in the idiosyncratic way practiced by Humpty Dumpty in Lewis Carroll’s *Through the Looking Glass* (1872, Chapter 6), the result would be communication anarchy. “Only in certain fields – such as literature – do we tolerate personal deviations from the semantic norms of the language.” (Needless to say, even then, ‘they have to make sense’.)

³¹ Note, that the need for phatic communion, or social cohesion, is a psychological one, and its study warrants inferences about the intended meanings of a word, that is, the intensional meaning which reveals connotations hidden in the denotations of words. Connotations, in turn, reveal attitudes, which uncover sets of beliefs and expectations; it is these ‘senses’ as opposed to ‘references’ which aid us in establishing what was ‘normative thinking’ in those times.

As a cautionary word, I would like to mention that I am aware of the fact that the many digressions and bifurcations in this paper could be removed or cut down and reserved for treatment in specialized articles in a more condensed manner under ‘strictly delineating’ headings. This, I have not wished to do for two reasons:

1. This is not a monograph. On the contrary, it is an intentional demonstration of how one might attempt to come to grips with a vast topic, that branches out endlessly, and which cannot be curbed at the expense of granting it its due width and depth.
2. The remarks, asides and deliberations which take place in the course of this paper serve to illuminate, I hope, the process through which the conclusions were arrived at, once one gets to the end of the paper, where they have been formulated (even if a first reading of this thesis might leave one with the impression that ‘too much extra load has been carted onto the carriage’.)

The above is, in a nutshell, a full account of my search for a method, the reasoning behind having chosen the systematic stylostatistical approach, with a reliance on contextual semantic deduction, which I apply within the framework provided by a list of clear-cut definitions offered by rhetoricians. The links which the approach I have selected has to a number of branches existing in linguistics, as well as my explicit awareness of the usefulness and applicability of interdisciplinary studies in making deductions, has, I hope, become evident, and is a conviction I hope to live up to in the pursuit of my conclusions.